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UNTYING THE GORGIANIC ‘NOT’: 
ARGUMENTATIVE STRUCTURE IN ON NOT-BEING1 
Gorgias’ On Not-Being survives only in two divergent summaries. Diels-Kranz’s classic 
edition prints the better-preserved version that appears in Sextus’ Adversus 
Mathematicos. Yet in recent years there has been rising interest in a second summary 
that survives as part of the anonymous De Melisso, Xenophane, Gorgia. The text of the 
MXG is more difficult; it contains substantial lacunae that often make it much harder to 
make grammatical let alone philosophical sense of. As Alexander Mourelatos reports, 
one manuscript has scribal note that reads: ‘The original contains many errors; no one 
should blame me; I just copy what I see.’2 The treatise’s state of preservation has aptly 
prompted Michael Gagarin to liken it to a black hole: ‘something we cannot see directly 
but know must exist because of certain effects it has on other objects.’3 
                                               
1 Many thanks to Verity Harte, Rachel Barney, Ken Winkler, and David Charles for 
helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. Thanks also to an anonymous 
reviewer for several helpful suggestions for improvement, as well as to Michael Gagarin 
for productive conversations about argumentative structure in Gorgias’ works. 
2 A. Mourelatos, ‘Gorgias on the Function of Language’, Philosophical Topics 15 (1987), 
135–70 at 164 n.3. 
3 M. Gagarin, ‘On the Not-Being of Gorgias’s “On Not-Being” (ONB)’, Philosophy & 
Rhetoric 30 (1997), 38–40 at 40. 
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 Scholarship on On Not-Being often begins by privileging one of the two treatises 
as more accurate and working from there.4 The MXG has recently been preferred in part 
for its likely preserving more of Gorgias’ original language.5 But the idea of a single 
                                               
4 The extreme version of this tendency is Diels-Kranz’ decision not even to print the 
MXG. A more recent example on the other side is J. Mansfeld, ‘Historical and 
Philosophical Aspects of Gorgias’ “On What Is Not”’, reprinted in Studies in the 
Historiography of Greek Philosophy (Assen, 1990), 97–125. Mansfeld cites a number of 
recent scholars who, like himself, consider the MXG to be more reliable (n.4, at 97). As 
a result, he only refers to Sextus ‘for some points of detail’ (98). Mourelatos largely 
follows suit calling the MXG ‘unquestionably’ the better source for the second part of 
the treatise (136). He does quote from Sextus, but again only to supplement his findings 
from the MXG; even with regards to passages that are preserved only by Sextus he is less 
than enthusiastic stating merely that ‘it is perhaps not impossible to recover behind that 
Hellenistic encrustation a recognizably Gorgianic thought’ (158). Likewise V. Caston, 
‘Gorgias on Thought and its Objects’, in D.W. Graham and V. Caston (edd.), Presocratic 
philosophy: essays in honour of Alexander Mourelatos (Aldershot, 2002), 205–32 is 
largely dismissive of the evidence from Sextus and relies on it only tentatively and 
infrequently (e.g. 222, 224, 229). Gagarin also notes that the MXG is the current favourite 
among translators (38). 
5 Much of the language Sextus uses is only attested in authors much later than Gorgias 
himself, whereas the language of the MXG is consistent with other works of the fourth 
and fifth centuries B.C.E. See G.B. Kerferd, ‘Gorgias on Nature or That Which Is Not’, 
Phronesis 1 (1955), 3–25 at 14; G. Calogero, Studi sull'Eleatismo (Florence, 19772), n.4 
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preferred paraphrase creates a false dichotomy; it may very well be that each paraphrase 
is closer to the original in different respects. I will show how an independent and 
charitable reading of both versions suggests that, while the MXG may indeed preserve 
more of Gorgias’ language, Sextus preserves more of the original argument’s structure. 
 One striking similarity is that both paraphrases explicitly split the argument into 
three parts: one arguing that nothing is, the second that even if it is it cannot be cognized, 
and the third that even if it can be cognized it cannot be communicated (Sextus 65, MXG 
979a12–13). I will focus on the first part, which preserves some of the most interesting 
material from a methodological perspective. This will help correct for the recent bias 
towards the MXG and for the relative neglect of the first part since Kerferd’s 1955 
article.6 I will show that there is a pattern of argumentation found throughout Gorgias’ 
works that is better represented by Sextus and explain how the difference between the 
two versions arose from a simple mistake made by the author of the MXG.7 This suggests 
                                               
at 158; and H. Diels, Aristotelis qui fertur de Melisso Xenophane Gorgia libelius (Berlin, 
1900), at 10. For a case study concerning the third part of the treatise see R.N. Gaines, 
‘Knowledge and Discourse in Gorgias's “On the Non-Existent or On Nature”’, 
Philosophy & Rhetoric 30 (1997), 1–12. 
6 Kerferd goes to great lengths to argue that the MXG preserves the same argument as 
Sextus does in the first part, though I will argue that they do differ in at least one crucial 
respect. Caston and Mourelatos give detailed analyses of the second and third part 
respectively, but set the first part aside. 
7 I will follow J. Mansfeld, ‘De Melisso Xenophane Gorgia: Pyrrhonizing 
Aristotelianism’, Rheinisches Museum für Philologie 131 (1988), 239–76 in referring to 
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that Sextus deserves more attention than he has received in the recent literature insofar 
as he more accurately preserves the structure of Gorgias’ argument, though it does not 
preclude the likelihood that the MXG is more accurate in other respects. 
§1: THE PATTERN 
The structure of the argument in the first part of On Not-Being is an instance of a general 
pattern found throughout Gorgias’ extant works. He often makes an exhaustive division 
then shows how each possibility points towards a single conclusion, allowing him to 
show how no matter which way you go his desired result follows. The two characteristic 
features of this strategy are (a) the use of exhaustive polylemmata,8 and (b) the primary 
aim of establishing the truth of some desired consequence of each lemma rather than the 
truth of the lemma itself. Related to the first characteristic is (c) the nesting of one 
polylemma within another. In this section I briefly establish this pattern as it appears in 
the Helen and Palamedes. In the next section I offer independent analyses of each 
paraphrase of On Not-Being that reveal how Sextus’ version preserves the same pattern, 
one that is strikingly similar to the Palamedes in particular. 
§1.1: The Helen 
                                               
the author of the MXG as ‘Anonymous’. Anonymous is standardly referred to with a 
masculine pronoun; while it is mere conjecture that the author would have been male, 
this is unfortunately all too likely given the long history of sexism. 
8 By ‘polylemma’ I simply mean a division into two or more possibilities, which can be 
represented as a disjunction with two or more disjuncts. 
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The argument of the Helen clearly employs the pattern of using what is taken to be an 
exhaustive polylemma with an eye to establishing the same positive conclusion in each 
case.9 This is an argument by cases, a species of the general pattern described above 
where a positive conclusion is derived from each lemma. The argument spans the entire 
work, introducing the goal of exonerating Helen in (2) and announcing the successful 
completion of that goal in (21). 
The main polylemmatic structure of the argument becomes clear in (5)–(6): 
(5)… I will proceed to the beginning of the ensuing speech, and I will set forth 
the causes on account of which it was likely10 for Helen’s expedition to Troy to 
come about. (6) For either she did the things she did by the will of Fate and the 
                                               
9 For an argument to fit the pattern discussed here, the polylemma need only be taken to 
be exhaustive. The argument will only be sound, however, if the polylemma truly is 
exhaustive. I will suggest that the relevant polylemma in the Helen is portrayed as 
exhaustive and taken to be so for the sake of the argument, though this is ultimately a 
mistake (perhaps even a self-conscious one on Gorgias’ part). 
10 See M. Gagarin and P. Woodruff, ‘The Sophists’, in P. Curd and D.W. Graham (edd.), 
The Oxford Handbook of Presocratic Philosophy (Oxford, 2008), 365–82 for translating 
εἰκός with a normative valence. In general they recommend ‘reasonable’ as an English 
translation, which Spatharas adopts for this case in D.G. Spatharas, ‘Gorgias: an edition 
of the extant texts and fragments with commentary and introduction’ (Diss., University 
of Glasgow, 2001). Yet here ‘reasonable’ is misleading since Gorgias is not enumerating 
cases that would make Helen’s action rational. For this reason, ‘likely’ is better in this 
instance. 
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resolution of the gods and the decrees of Necessity, or having been snatched up 
by force, or persuaded by speeches, <or seized by love>.11 
(5)… ἐ'ὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ 1έλλοντος λόγου 'ροβήσο1αι, καὶ 'ροθήσο1αι 
τὰς αἰτίας, δι’ ἃς εἰκὸς ἦν γενέσθαι τὸν τῆς Ἑλένης εἰς τὴν Τροίαν στόλον. 
(6) ἢ γὰρ Τύχης βουλή1ασι καὶ θεῶν βουλεύ1ασι καὶ Ἀνάγκης 
ψηφίσ1ασιν ἔ'ραξεν ἃ ἔ'ραξεν, ἢ βίαι ἁρ'ασθεῖσα, ἢ λόγοις 'εισθεῖσα, 
<ἢ ἔρωτι ἁλοῦσα>.12 
                                               
11 I am including the medieval conjecture accepted by most modern commentators. The 
text as it is transmitted does not mention the fourth possibility, but Gorgias transitions to 
it in (15) in a way that suggests it was understood to have already been mentioned, stating 
simply: ‘and I will go through the fourth cause with the fourth argument’ (τὴν δὲ 
τετάρτην αἰτίαν τῶι τετάρτωι λόγωι διέξει1ι). Here is the logical place for that to 
have happened. It also fits well with the mention of this option in the final summary 
quoted immediately below. 
12 All translations are my own and based off of the Greek text of DK with more recent 
texts and translations consulted in addition. The following were particularly useful. 
Those including all of Gorgias’ works are Spatharas’ commentary; D.W. Graham (ed.), 
The Texts of Early Greek Philosophy: The Complete Fragments and Selected 
Testimonies of the Major Presocratics (Cambridge, 2010), 740–50; T. Buchheim (ed.), 
Reden, Fragmente Und Testimonien (Hamburg, 19892), 39–64; and M. Untersteiner, 
Sofisti: Testimonianze E Frammenti (Florence, 1949), 36–74. In addition, B. Cassin, Si 
Parménide: Le Traité Anonyme De Melisso, Xenophane, Gorgia (Lille, 1980) and H. 
Diels, Aristotelis qui fertur De Melisso Xenophane Gorgia libellus (Berlin, 1900) contain 
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and again when the argument is summarized in (20): 
(20) So how could one regard the blame of Helen as just, being someone who 
was either in love or persuaded by speech or snatched up by force or compelled 
by divine compulsion when she did the things she did, escaping the charge in 
every way? 
(20) 'ῶς οὖν χρὴ δίκαιον ἡγήσασθαι τὸν τῆς Ἑλένης 1ῶ1ον, ἥτις εἴτ’ 
ἐρασθεῖσα εἴτε λόγωι 'εισθεῖσα εἴτε βίαι ἁρ'ασθεῖσα εἴτε ὑ'ὸ θείας 
ἀνάγκης ἀναγκασθεῖσα ἔ'ραξεν ἃ ἔ'ραξε, 'άντως διαφεύγει τὴν 
αἰτίαν; 
 
As these two summaries make clear, the argument operates by articulating four 
possibilities and examining each one in turn. This is precisely what happens in the 
intervening fourteen sections. Gorgias first examines the case of divine compulsion (6), 
then force (7), speech (8–14), and love (15–19), showing that Helen is not to be blamed 
in each case. Thus it has the structure of a fourfold polylemma. 
It is also clear that Gorgias presents the polylemma as an exhaustive one. The 
division must be exhaustive (that is, on the assumption that Helen did in fact go to Troy) 
                                               
the MXG version of On Not-Being. For the Helen, D. MacDowell, Encomium of Helen 
(Bristol, 1982) was also consulted, as were the translations of J.M. Dillon and T. Gergel, 
The Greek Sophists (New York, 2009) and M. Gagarin and P. Woodruff, Early Greek 
Political Thought from Homer to the Sophists (Cambridge, 1995). 
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for the argument to be valid, and Gorgias does treat it as a valid argument.13 Gorgias 
begins by clearly laying out the aim of the argument in (2): 
(2)… Adding some reasoning to my speech, I would like to protect the woman 
being spoken of badly from the charge, to reveal those blaming her as liars, and 
both to show the truth and hold them back from ignorance. 
(2)… ἐγὼ δὲ βούλο1αι λογισ1όν τινα τῶι λόγωι δοὺς τὴν 1ὲν κακῶς 
ἀκούουσαν 'αῦσαι τῆς αἰτίας, τοὺς δὲ 1ε1φο1ένους ψευδο1ένους 
ἐ'ιδείξαι καὶ δείξαι τε τἀληθὲς καὶ14 'αῦσαι τῆς ἀ1αθίας. 
 
At the end he explicitly refers back to this goal as having been achieved: 
(21) I removed the disrepute of a woman through speech, sticking to the 
resolution which I set forth at the beginning of my speech… 
(21) ἀφεῖλον τῶι λόγωι δύσκλειαν γυναικός, ἐνέ1εινα τῶι νό1ωι ὃν 
ἐθέ1ην ἐν ἀρχῆι τοῦ λόγου… 
 
                                               
13 Cf. J. Barnes, The Presocratic Philosophers (New York, 1982) at 416. I will 
distinguish strictly exhaustive polylemmata, which cover all possibilities, from 
polylemmata that are conditional on some other possibility obtaining. Most of the 
polylemmata used by Gorgias are conditional in this sense. 
14 Following MacDowell’s reconstruction of the text (cf. ‘Gorgias, Alkidamas, Cripps 
and Palatine Manuscripts’ 120-121). The manuscripts read ἢ rather than καὶ. 
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These statements would not make sense unless, at least at some level, Gorgias takes 
himself to be giving a compelling argument. In so far as the argument is meant as an 
argument at all, then, we should read it as offering an exhaustive division.15 
 Gorgias’ introductory and concluding statements also show how his aim is not to 
establish which of the four possibilities actually obtained, but rather to establish what 
follows from each: Helen is not to be blamed. Thus the argument of the Helen also meets 
the second characteristic feature of this recurring pattern. I agree with Barney’s 
reconstruction as follows: 
(1) Helen went to Troy either because of fate and the gods (I here simplify ‘the 
will of fortune and the plan of the gods and the decree of necessity’) or because 
of force or because of persuasion by speech [logos] or because of erōs. 
(2) If she went to Troy because of fate and the gods, Helen is not to blame. 
(3) If she went to Troy because she was forced, Helen is not to blame. 
(4) If she went to Troy because she was persuaded by logos, Helen is not to blame. 
(5) If she went to Troy because of erōs, Helen is not to blame. 
(6) Therefore, Helen is not to blame for going to Troy (from 1+2+3+4+5). 
(Barney, at 5) 
 
                                               
15 While we are meant to initially take the argument as exhaustive, the fact that the 
argument appears to generalize such that no one is ever to blame, and that Gorgias ends 
by calling it an amusement ('αίγνιον), may indicate that we are meant to question 
whether it really did cover all of the relevant possibilities in the first place. For further 
discussion of this point see R. Barney, ‘Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen’, in E. Schliesser 
(ed.), Ten Neglected Classics of Philosophy (Oxford, 2016), 1–25.  
 
 
10 
Furthermore, the Helen briefly exhibits a third element that is found in Gorgias’ other 
works. When discussing the case of love, Gorgias makes another dilemmatic split: love 
is either the pleasing effect of a beautiful body, or a god. But still, either way Helen is 
not to blame (19). This nesting of one polylemma within another appears time and again 
in the Palamedes and the first part of On Not-Being as well. I have included a visual 
diagram of the argument’s structure in an appendix for easy comparison with the 
arguments of the Palamedes and On Not-Being. 
§1.2: The Palamedes 
The same pattern of employing an exhaustive polylemma with a focus of deriving some 
desired conclusion in each case is even more prevalent in the Palamedes. The same goes 
for the further pattern of nested polylemmata. One difference is that the Palamedes is 
often focussed on deriving a negative consequence from each lemma rather than a 
positive one. When the polylemma is conditional on some other possibility obtaining, 
this then serves as a reductio of that possibility. The following is a simple example: 
suppose that if I had gone to the mountains I would have either walked, biked, or taken 
a train. Now suppose that each option would have been impossible. On this basis, we can 
conclude that I must not have gone to the mountains. As opposed to the argument by 
cases in the Helen, I will call this specific pattern a ‘conditional polylemmatic reductio’. 
Being a defence speech, the implicit aim of the Palamedes is to argue that 
Palamedes should not be sentenced to death. Gorgias has Palamedes undertake three 
different argumentative strategies throughout the speech to establish this main 
conclusion. The first is to establish that he is not guilty by showing that he could not have 
been both willing and able to commit the crime (6–21). The second is to undermine 
Odysseus’ trustworthiness as a witness (22–32). Finally, he argues that a summary 
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judgment would be overly hasty in this case (33–6). For present purposes I will focus on 
the first strategy, which proceeds by a series of conditional polylemmatic reductiones. 
 The initial strategy can be further subdivided into two alternative sets of 
arguments, arguments for the claim (a) that Palamedes would not have been able, and 
arguments for the claim (b) that Palamedes would not have been willing. This much is 
implicit in the way Gorgias has Palamedes set it up: 
(5)… But if he [Odysseus] made the charge thinking that things were thus, I will 
show that he doesn’t speak the truth in two ways: for if I had been willing I 
wouldn’t have been able, nor had I been able would I have been willing to attempt 
such deeds. 
(5)… εἰ δὲ οἰό1ενος οὕτω ταῦτα ἔχειν ἐ'οιεῖτο τὴν κατηγορίαν, οὐκ 
ἀληθῆ λέγειν διὰ δισσῶν ὑ1ῖν ἐ'ιδείξω τρό'ων· οὔτε γὰρ βουληθεὶς 
ἐδυνά1ην ἂν οὔτε δυνά1ενος ἐβουλήθην ἔργοις ἐ'ιχειρεῖν τοιούτοις. 
 
Thus the first set of arguments for (a) have the following form: 
(i) if Palamedes were guilty of the crime, then he must have been both willing 
and able, 
(ii) but he would not have been able, [claim (a)] 
(iii) therefore, he is not guilty. 
 
And the second set of arguments for (b) have the related form: 
(i) if Palamedes were guilty of the crime, then he must have been both willing 
and able, 
(ii) but he would not have been willing, [claim (b)] 
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(iii) therefore, he is not guilty. 
 
These arguments have a concessive structure that allows Palamedes to accommodate 
potential objections: he can grant his opponent that he was willing, for instance, but still 
show that even granting this he would not have been able. This technique appears in the 
structure of On Not-Being as well. 
There are ten arguments for the conclusion that Palamedes would not have been 
able to commit treason (6–12, 21). They stand out for the nested, polylemmatic reductio 
structure they create: Palamedes tends to split the space of possibilities into multiple 
options, rule out every option but one, then repeat by splitting the last option into more 
possibilities, etc. Even then he grants one of the previously ruled-out possibilities for the 
sake of argument and proceeds to give another nested polylemmatic reductio. Thus the 
overarching structure is a conditional polylemmatic reductio, the conclusion being that 
the initial premise (that Palamedes was able) is to be rejected. 
The way the argument is introduced makes it clear that this is a reductio against 
the possibility of Palamedes committing treason: 
(6) I will now proceed to the first argument, that I am incapable of doing this. For 
some first beginning of the treason would have needed to come about, and that 
first beginning would have been a discussion… 
(6) ἐ'ὶ τοῦτον δὲ τὸν λόγον εἶ1ι 'ρῶτον, ὡς ἀδύνατός εἰ1ι τοῦτο 'ράττειν. 
ἔδει γάρ τινα 'ρῶτον ἀρχὴν γενέσθαι τῆς 'ροδοσίας, ἡ δὲ ἀρχὴ λόγος ἂν 
εἴη… 
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The imperfect ἔδει is important. It extends the counterfactual reasoning begun in the 
previous section (again expressed with the imperfect).16 But it is natural to ask: a first 
beginning would have needed to come about… if what? The suppressed premise must 
be ‘if it had been possible’.17 Thus the implicit structure here is: 
                                               
16 As Smyth notes under ‘Present and Past Unreal Conditions’: ‘the imperfect refers to 
present time or (sometimes) to a continued or habitual past act or state’ (Smyth, 2304). 
The imperfect here is the appropriate tense for Palamedes’ state of inability that is 
presumed to be continuous from that past time up through the present moment of his 
speech. 
17 This fits best with the imperfect and with the structure of the ensuing argument of the 
Palamedes. If the suppressed premise were instead ‘if it had happened…’, as suggested 
in A.A Long, Methods of Argument in Gorgias, Palamedes’ Η ΑΡΧΑΙΑ ΣΟΦΙΣΤΙΚΗ, 
The Sophistic Movement (1984), 233–41, then it is difficult to see how the ensuing 
argument would work. It could have the structure: (i) if it had happened then XYZ would 
have happened, (ii) but XYZ could not have happened, (iii) therefore it did not happen, 
but in this case the conclusion would be that it did not happen, not that Palamedes would 
not have been able, which is the expressed aim. L. Càffaro, Encomio di Elena; Apologia 
di Palamede (Florence, 1997) suggests that the initial hypothesis is ‘Palamede è un 
traditore’ (Palamedes is a traitor), which cannot be right for the same reason that the 
argument would no longer be aimed at the explicit conclusion that Palamedes was not 
able. This conclusion is explicit not only in the way the argument is introduced but also 
in the way it ends in (12): ‘Thus it would have in fact been entirely impossible for me to 
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(i) if it had been possible for a Greek to do it, then XYZ would have been 
needed, 
(ii) but XYZ would not have been possible 
(iii) therefore, it would not have been possible for a Greek to do it 
(iv) therefore, a fortiori, Palamedes would not have been able [claim (a)] 
 
Understanding the structure in this way also fits well with the series of potential optatives 
that follow in the ensuing argument. 
As mentioned above, there are ten distinct arguments in this section that fill out the 
‘XYZ’ in premises (i) and (ii) above in different ways. The first argument (6–7) fills 
them out as follows: 
(a) if the crime were possible, then it would have been possible for Palamedes to 
communicate with the Trojans 
(b) if communication was possible, it was possible either one-on-one or with a third 
interpreter 
(c) either way would not have been possible (since they do not speak the same 
language and an interpreter would have added another witness) 
(d) therefore, communication would not have been possible [by (b)–(c)] 
 
The ensuing arguments follow the same pattern (see the appendix for a complete 
summary). They each take the form of conditional polylemmatic reductiones, with a 
                                               
do any of these things in any way’ ('άντως ἄρα καὶ 'άντηι 'άντα 'ράττειν 
ἀδύνατον ἦν 1οι). 
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series of nested polylemmatic divisions conditional on the treason being possible. 
Negative results in each case provide a reductio of that possibility. 
An analogous structure can be found in the next part of the Palamedes. Gorgias 
has Palamedes offer another polylemmatic reductio, this time for claim (b) that, even 
granting his ability to commit treason, he would not have been willing (13–19). It begins 
with a large polylemma as in the Helen, with six options considered. And once again we 
see the same nesting of one polylemma within another as diagrammed in the appendix. 
This general pattern, and more specifically the use of a nested, polylemmatic reductio, 
resurfaces in the first part of On Not-Being. 
§2: THE FIRST PART OF ON NOT-BEING 
When it comes to the first part of On Not-Being, there are significant structural 
differences in the surviving paraphrases. Both include roughly the same number of 
arguments,18 but their order and internal relations differ. In Sextus’ version the argument 
structure is laid out explicitly and systematically as a nested polylemmatic reductio. The 
MXG, on the other hand, has three independent arguments: it begins with two arguments 
that are said to be Gorgias’ own (ἴδιον, 979a23), criticizes them, then puts forward a 
separate polylemmatic reductio whose elements are said to be borrowed from others 
(specifically Zeno, Melissus, and Leucippus). These differences are best explained by 
                                               
18 The correspondence is only rough, and partly influenced by the natural impulse to try 
to identify arguments from each version with one another. Still there are clear cases of 
arguments that appear in only one of the two paraphrases, for instance Sextus (75–76) 
and MXG 980a3–8. For an outline of the similarities and differences between the 
arguments in the first part, see p. 000 below. 
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the hypothesis that Sextus’ version is closer to the original structure and that Anonymous 
rearranges its arguments in the MXG. To show this, it will be important to analyse the 
structure of each paraphrase separately. 
§2.1: Sextus’ version: a nested polylemmatic reductio 
Sextus’ version of the first part of On Not-Being contains a nested polylemmatic reductio 
much like that of the first two parts of the Palamedes and their positive counterpart in 
the Helen. This structural similarity is part of why Sextus is the more likely candidate for 
preserving the original argument’s structure.19 
After an initial introduction that sets out the tripartite structure of the whole 
treatise, Sextus summarizes the argument of the first part as follows: 
(66) First, then, that nothing is, he concludes in the following way: if indeed 
anything is, then either being or not-being is, or both being as well as not-being 
                                               
19 One might worry that, even before addressing the structure, one needs to make better 
sense of the subject matter, more specifically whatever is denoted by τὸ ὄν, τὸ 1ὴ ὄν, 
and εἶναι more generally. These are familiar challenges in interpreting the Eleatics as 
well, though in Gorgias’ case there is the extra complication that Sextus is possibly 
rephrasing Gorgias’ initial terminology. In the end, however, these issues will not affect 
the way one understands the underlying method indicated by Sextus’ paraphrase. For 
recent discussions of how best to understand the verb ‘to be’ in Greek philosophy, see 
C.H. Kahn, ‘A Return to the Theory of the Verb be and the Concept of Being’, Ancient 
Philosophy 24 (2004), 381–405 and L. Brown, ‘The verb “to be” in Greek philosophy’, 
in S. Everson (ed.) Language: Companion to ancient thought 3 (Cambridge, 1994), 212–
36. 
 
 
17 
is. But neither is it the case that being is, as he will establish, nor not-being, as 
will be explained, nor being and not-being, as he will prove even this. Therefore 
it’s not the case that anything is.20 
(66) ὅτι 1ὲν οὖν οὐδὲν ἔστιν, ἐ'ιλογίζεται τὸν τρό'ον τοῦτον· εἰ γὰρ ἔστι 
<τι>,21 ἤτοι τὸ ὂν ἔστιν ἢ τὸ 1ὴ ὄν, ἢ καὶ τὸ ὂν ἔστι καὶ τὸ 1ὴ ὄν. οὔτε δὲ τὸ 
ὂν ἔστιν, ὡς 'αραστήσει, οὔτε τὸ 1ὴ ὄν, ὡς 'αρα1υθήσεται, οὔτε τὸ ὂν 
καὶ <τὸ>22 1ὴ ὄν, ὡς καὶ τοῦτο διδάξει· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τι. 
 
Here I have given a neutral translation by simply rendering τὸ ὄν as ‘being’, τὸ 1ὴ ὄν 
as ‘not-being’, and forms of the verb εἶναι with a simple ‘is’ (leaving any extra 
supplement implicit as it is in the Greek). The advantage of the translations ‘being’ and 
‘not-being’ is that they preserve the participial form of the original, making it easier to 
                                               
20 I understand Sextus to be using the conclusion in the final clause here, ‘it’s not the 
case that anything is’, interchangeably with the conclusion stated at the beginning of this 
section as well as the end of (76), ‘nothing is’. 
21 Bekker’s emendation here is well motivated. There is sign of a lacuna as ἔστι should 
read ἔστιν given that it is followed by a vowel. Furthermore, there is support for the 
missing τι in the formulation at the end of the section (οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τι). Finally, the τι 
could have easily dropped out due to haplography. 
22 It is likely that τό has dropped out of the manuscripts since, when this option is picked 
up again in (75), it is stated with τό repeated: τό τε ὂν καὶ τὸ 1ὴ ὄν. The meaning here 
must be ‘being and not-being’ as I have translated rather than ‘that which is and is not’ 
as the Greek without the second τό would suggest. 
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distinguish this construction from finite uses of the verb.23 What is clear, and is most 
important for our purposes, is that this sets up the overarching structure of a conditional 
polylemmatic reductio, with three exhaustive options conditional on there being anything 
whatsoever (see the appendix for a diagram of this structure). Thus the force of the 
reductio is to show that nothing whatsoever is.24 
                                               
23 Kerferd prefers the translations ‘that which is’ and ‘that which is not’ because they 
allow for a more indefinite reading of the subject in either case, allowing that any 
theoretical construct of previous thinkers could be substituted (14–16, 22). I take it that 
Kerferd supposes ‘being’ and ‘not-being’, by contrast, to indicate definite concepts that 
do not allow this indefinite substitutable reading, though I do not think that we have clear 
concepts corresponding to the terms in English to preclude this reading. I intend to use 
‘being’ and ‘not-being’ as placeholders that are ambiguous between the definite (single 
concept) and indefinite (schema for inserting any construct) readings. 
24 One might worry, however, that the third option is redundant. This option immediately 
stands out as somewhat odd; the first two options appear to be contradictories, in which 
case they alone exhaust logical space. Surely they are at least contrary to one another, in 
which case we should know in advance that both cannot obtain at once. If they are neither 
contrary nor contradictory, then it becomes hard to see how the three options listed are 
meant to be exhaustive in the first place. It is possible that Sextus or even Gorgias 
recognizes the redundancy, as hinted at by the rather emphatic ‘he will prove even this’ 
(καὶ τοῦτο διδάξει) in (66) quoted above. Another suggestion mentioned by Graham is 
that the conjunctive case is a direct response to the Atomists, who thought that the world 
was made up of both atoms (being) and void (not-being). While this option is strange, 
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In the remainder of the first part as reported by Sextus, each of the three options 
is systematically refuted, thus completing the reductio as set out in the introductory 
section. Interestingly, the sequence of arguments against the claim that being is mimics 
the overarching structure of the first part, thus creating a structure of nested polylemmata 
as in Gorgias’ other works. Once again the structure is laid out explicitly: 
(68) And next, neither is it the case that being is. For if being is, then it is either 
eternal or generated or eternal and generated at the same time. But neither is it 
eternal nor generated nor both, as we will show. Therefore it’s not the case that 
being is. For if being is eternal… 
(68) καὶ 1ὴν οὐδὲ τὸ ὂν ἔστιν. εἰ γὰρ τὸ ὂν ἔστιν, ἤτοι ἀίδιόν ἐστιν ἢ 
γενητὸν ἢ ἀίδιον ἅ1α καὶ γενητόν· οὔτε δὲ ἀίδιόν ἐστιν οὔτε γενητὸν οὔτε 
ἀ1φότερα, ὡς δείξο1εν· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τὸ ὄν. εἰ γὰρ ἀίδιόν ἐστι τὸ ὄν… 
 
The parallel with (66) is quite close. This creates a nested polylemmatic reductio, as can 
be seen in the argument structure diagrams in the appendix. 
 One of the most puzzling sections is the intervening reductio of the not-being 
option in (67). In §2.2 I will argue that the complications of this section help explain how 
Anonymous might have misunderstood the overarching argumentative structure. For this 
reason, a closer look at (67) is in order. The main takeaway will be that the argument 
consistently requires understanding a wide-scope negation, though there is one 
intentional slippage at the beginning. The difference is important; the narrow-scope 
                                               
and perhaps self-consciously so, the overarching structure of a conditional polylemmatic 
reductio is still quite clear. 
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claim ‘not-being is not’ is not strictly warranted by the argument, which instead supports 
the wide-scope claim ‘it’s not the case that not-being is’.25 The section runs as follows: 
(67) And indeed not-being, to begin, is not.26 For if not-being is, it will be and 
will not be at the same time: for in so far as it is conceived as not being, it will 
not be, and insofar as it is not-being, it will in turn be. But it is entirely out of 
place27 for something to be and not to be at the same time. Thus it is not the case 
that not-being is.28 And alternatively, if not-being is, being will not be: for these 
are opposite to one another, and if to be goes along with not-being, not to be will 
                                               
25 To see the difference, compare the claims ‘it’s not the case that all roads are ploughed’ 
and ‘all roads are not-ploughed’. The latter is equivalent to ‘all roads are unploughed’ 
and is not consistent with there being any ploughed roads. The former, however, leaves 
open the possibility that some roads are ploughed while others are not.  
26 Here is the intentional slippage where the negation is narrow-scope (in the Greek, οὐκ 
clearly modifies ἔστιν rather than the whole clause). 
27 I have translated ἄτο'ον literally as ‘out of place’, but the force in the Greek is 
stronger than that of the English: this is not merely to say that it would be strange or 
surprising, but rather illogical or bizarre enough to warrant a reductio. 
28 The negation is ambiguous between a wide-scope reading and a narrow-scope reading; 
οὐκ could be modifying ἔστι (narrow-scope) or the whole clause (wide-scope). I have 
gone with the wide-scope translation strictly warranted by the argument, though again 
the ambiguity may be intentional. 
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go along with being. But it’s not at all the case that being is not; nor then will not-
being be.29 
(67) καὶ δὴ τὸ 1ὲν 1ὴ ὂν οὐκ ἔστιν. εἰ γὰρ τὸ 1ὴ ὂν ἔστιν, ἔσται τε ἅ1α καὶ 
οὐκ ἔσται· ἧι 1ὲν γὰρ οὐκ ὂν νοεῖται, οὐκ ἔσται, ἧι δὲ ἔστι 1ὴ ὂν,30 'άλιν 
ἔσται. 'αντελῶς δὲ ἄτο'ον τὸ εἶναί τι ἅ1α καὶ 1ὴ εἶναι· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τὸ 
1ὴ ὄν. καὶ ἄλλως, εἰ τὸ 1ὴ ὂν ἔστι, τὸ ὂν οὐκ ἔσται· ἐναντία γάρ ἐστι ταῦτα 
ἀλλήλοις, καὶ εἰ τῶι 1ὴ ὄντι συ1βέβηκε τὸ εἶναι, τῶι ὄντι συ1βήσεται τὸ 
1ὴ εἶναι. οὐχὶ δέ γε τὸ ὂν οὐκ ἔστιν· <τοίνυν> οὐδὲ τὸ 1ὴ ὂν ἔσται. 
 
On the face of it there are two arguments; ‘and alternatively’ (καὶ ἄλλως) indicates a 
transition from one argument to another.31 But there is a puzzle as to how exactly they 
relate to one another. The transition suggests that they are two arguments for the same 
conclusion, which is further supported by the similarity of structure in both arguments; 
both begin with the hypothesis ‘if not-being is’ and give a reductio against that 
hypothesis. Yet they do not appear to state the same conclusion. The first conclusion is 
put in narrow-scope terms, ‘not-being is not’, and the second in wide-scope terms, ‘it’s 
not the case that not-being is’. 
                                               
29 Here the negation is unambiguously wide-scope (οὐδέ modifies the whole clause).  
30 Manuscript N has τό before 1ὴ ὄν in which case the more natural translation would 
be ‘in so far as not-being is’. 
31 Another clear example of καὶ ἄλλως indicating an alternative argument for the same 
conclusion occurs at the beginning of (73). 
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Strictly speaking, both arguments appear to license only the wide-scope version 
of the claim.32 Thus it is more plausible to read both as arguments for the same 
conclusion. But if this is right, then why the switch? The pattern of narrow-scope vs 
wide-scope claims throughout this part of the text gives us some traction.33 In general, 
explicitly narrow-scope claims are infrequent. The polylemmatic reductio structure 
licenses wide-scope claims, and explicitly wide-scope claims do indeed surface at crucial 
                                               
32 Both arguments have the same reductio structure, and a reductio only warrants the 
wide-scope claim. Using the example from n.25 above, if I run a reductio against the 
claim ‘all roads are ploughed’ then I have only established the truth of the wide-scope 
claim ‘it’s not the case that all roads are ploughed’. Suppose, for instance, that the 
reductio depends on only the more accessible roads being ploughed while the road to the 
mountains was skipped; in this case, some roads are ploughed and some are not, 
warranting the true claim ‘it’s not the case that all roads are ploughed’ but making ‘all 
roads are not-ploughed’ false. 
33 It is unlikely to be a simple mistake since Gorgias appears to be sensitive to the 
distinction between narrow-scope and wide-scope claims in the ensuing argument. The 
second argument of (66) above dismisses the narrow-scope claim that ‘being is not’ as 
part of the reasoning behind denying the claim that ‘not-being is’. But the next argument 
embraces the wide-scope claim ‘it’s not the case that being is’. To be consistent, Gorgias 
has to maintain that the narrow-scope claim ‘being is not’ is false and the wide-scope 
claim ‘it’s not the case that being is’ is true. He has to be sensitive to the distinction to 
pull this off. 
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junctures in the argument.34 So why does (67) begin with the narrow-scope claim? The 
best explanation is that it is an intentional slippage used to set up the argument in (75). 
In (75) the target is the conjunctive claim ‘both being and not-being are’. The 
reductio depends on the narrow-scope claim from (67), ‘not-being is not’: 
(75) And that it is indeed not the case that both are, both being and not-being, can 
easily be concluded. For if in fact not-being is and being is, not-being will be the 
same as being in so far as their being is concerned; and for this reason neither of 
them is. For it is agreed that not-being is not, and it has been shown that being 
stands the same in this respect, thus it too will not be. 
(75) ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲ ἀ1φότερα ἔστιν, τό τε ὂν καὶ τὸ 1ὴ ὄν, εὐε'ιλόγιστον. 
εἴ'ερ γὰρ τὸ 1ὴ ὂν ἔστι καὶ τὸ ὂν ἔστι, ταὐτὸν ἔσται τῶι ὄντι τὸ 1ὴ ὂν ὅσον 
ἐ'ὶ τῶι εἶναι· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐδέτερον αὐτῶν ἔστιν. ὅτι γὰρ τὸ 1ὴ ὂν οὐκ 
ἔστιν, ὁ1όλογον· δέδεικται δὲ ταὐτὸ τούτωι καθεστὼς τὸ ὄν· καὶ αὐτὸ 
τοίνυν οὐκ ἔσται. 
 
                                               
34 For instance, at the end of (74) the first two prongs of the argument are summarized in 
explicitly wide-scope terms: ‘But indeed, for these reasons it is clear that neither is it the 
case that being is nor that not-being is’ (ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὅτι 1ὲν οὔτε τὸ ὂν ἔστιν οὔτε τὸ 1ὴ 
ὂν ἔστιν, ἐκ τούτων συ1φανές). The first prong (it’s not the case that not-being is) is 
precisely the argument that was made in (67). We then see the same summary in wide-
scope terms at the very end of the argument of the first part in (76): ‘… from which it 
follows that nothing is. For if neither being is nor not-being nor both, and nothing is 
recognized beyond these, nothing is’ (οἷς ἕ'εται τὸ 1ηδὲν εἶναι. εἰ γὰρ 1ήτε τὸ ὂν 
ἔστι 1ήτε τὸ 1ὴ ὂν 1ήτε ἀ1φότερα, 'αρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν νοεῖται, οὐδὲν ἔστιν). 
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The argument here simply assumes that the narrow-scope claim ‘not-being is not’ is 
already agreed upon.35 Yet, while it was indeed stated as the conclusion to the first 
argument of (67), only the wide-scope claim was warranted. This suggests that Sextus 
(either following Gorgias or on his own) equivocates between the narrow- and wide-
scope claims on purpose; he uses whichever version best fits his current needs (which is 
the strictly warranted wide-scope claim for most purposes, but the narrow-scope claim 
for this particular argument). The narrow-scope claim has indeed been mentioned, but 
technically has not been argued for. Further support would need to be given or it would 
have to be endorsed on its own for the argument in (75) to go through.36  
                                               
35 As I understand it, the argument runs as follows: 
(i) Assume for reductio that being is and not-being is 
(ii) Being and not-being are the same in so far as their being is concerned [by (i)] 
(iii) Not-being is not [argued for in (67)] 
(iv) If not-being is not, and being and not-being are the same in so far as their being 
is concerned, then being is not. 
(v) Being is not [by (ii)–(iv)] 
(vi) Neither being nor not-being is [by (iii), (v)] 
(vii) Contradiction [by (i), (vi)] 
(viii) Therefore, it’s not the case that being is and not-being is [by reductio, (i)–(vii)] 
36 This is one way in which the argument in (75) is deficient, though it is not the only 
oddity. The lemma discussed here, ‘both being and not-being are’, already seems 
redundant (see n.24 above). 
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Despite this sleight of hand, the arguments in (67) are by no means blatantly 
fallacious, and the text is actually quite careful with the scope of the negation. The 
structure is that of two alternative arguments for the conclusion that it’s not the case that 
not-being is, and thus part of the overarching polylemmatic reductio. Yet the structure 
along with the scope of the claims argued for is misinterpreted by Anonymous, which in 
part explains why he reorders the arguments in the MXG as I will argue below. 
§2.2: MXG Version, First Part Rearranged? 
The MXG, too, reports a polylemmatic reductio, though one that is much less intricate 
than those surveyed so far. It also reports two separate arguments whose counterparts in 
Sextus play a subsidiary role as part of the polylemmatic reductio instead (see the 
appendix for a comparison of the two structures). Below I begin with a series of detailed 
observations about the similarities and differences between the two versions, then offer 
a hypothesis that explains them. 
Two unique features of the MXG version immediately stand out. First, 
Anonymous shows a keen interest in the provenance of Gorgias’ arguments. The first 
part of the MXG begins as follows: 
And to begin that [nothing] is,37 he puts together the things that have been said 
by others, as many as say opposite things about the things that are… 
καὶ ὅτι 1ὲν οὐκ ἔστι, συνθεὶς τὰ ἑτέροις εἰρη1ένα, ὅσοι 'ερὶ τῶν ὄντων 
λέγοντες τἀναντία… 
 (979a13–15) 
 
                                               
37 Understanding οὐδέν as implicit from the previous line (Οὐκ εἶναί φησιν οὐδέν· εἰ 
δ’ ἔστιν, ἄγνωστον εἶναι…) with the same implicit structure. 
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Unlike Sextus, Anonymous emphasizes that the argument of the first part involves 
borrowing opposed arguments from others. He continues to stress this point by 
identifying the origins of different arguments. After a brief summary of the part of the 
argument that borrows most heavily from others, Anonymous notes: 
some he sets out to show as Melissus does, others as Zeno, after his own first 
display… 
τὰ 1ὲν ὡς Μέλισσος, τὰ δὲ ὡς Ζήνων ἐ'ιχειρεῖ δεικνύειν 1ετὰ τὴν 'ρώτην 
ἴδιον αὑτοῦ ἀ'όδειξιν…   (979a22–4) 
 
He goes on to give Gorgias’ original arguments. Next, he sets out the arguments 
borrowed from others where he again mentions Melissus (979b22) and Zeno (979b25, 
37) and adds ‘the so-called arguments of Leucippus’ (980a7). None of the arguments in 
this latter group are explicitly said to originate from Gorgias himself. The arguments as 
he reports them are divided between first those that are original to Gorgias, and later 
those that are not. 
The second peculiar feature of the MXG is that it offers a critique of the arguments 
that are original to Gorgias. Anonymous criticizes those arguments immediately after 
considering them, before moving on to those that are borrowed from others (he does not 
criticize the latter). 
Despite these obvious differences, there are obvious similarities as well. Most of 
the arguments of the MXG version appear to have a close parallel in Sextus’ version.38 
                                               
38 The clearest exception is the final argument in the MXG version that nothing is moved 
(980a1-8) which does not have a parallel in Sextus’ version. 
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Below is a list of what I take to be the main arguments attributed to Gorgias’ On Not-
Being by the MXG version, with references to each counterpart in Sextus: 
(1) first original argument that nothing is (979a25–31) 
a. similar to the first argument against the claim that not-being is in Sextus 
(67) in that both are based on the hypothesis that not-being is not-being: 
i. MXG: ‘For if not-being is not-being, not-being would be no less 
than being’ (εἰ 1ὲν γὰρ τὸ 1ὴ εἶναι ἔστι 1ὴ εἶναι, οὐδὲν ἂν 
ἧττον τὸ 1ὴ ὂν τοῦ ὄντος εἴη) (MXG)39 
ii. Sextus: ‘For if not-being is… insofar as it is not-being, it will in 
turn be’ (εἰ γὰρ τὸ 1ὴ ὂν ἔστιν... ἧι δὲ ἔστι40 1ὴ ὂν, 'άλιν 
ἔσται) 
b. similar to the second argument against the claim that not-being is in 
Sextus (67) in making the inference that being is not by a principle of 
opposites: 
i. MXG: ‘But still if not-being is, being, he says, is not, that is the 
opposite’ (εἰ δ’ ὅ1ως τὸ 1ὴ εἶναι ἔστι, τὸ εἶναι, φησίν, οὐκ 
ἔστι, τὸ ἀντικεί1ενον) 
                                               
39 Alternatively, one might understand the final clause as carrying over the previous 
subject and containing a complete use of the copula rather than an incomplete use as I 
have translated it (and as found in Sextus). In this case the translation would be ‘[not-
being] would be not-being no less than being’. Either way, however, the hypotheses and 
the reductio structure appear to be the same. 
40 Manuscript N has τό after ἔστι. 
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ii. Sextus: ‘if not-being is, being will not be: for these are opposite to 
one another’ (εἰ τὸ 1ὴ ὂν ἔστι, τὸ ὂν οὐκ ἔσται· ἐναντία γάρ 
ἐστι ταῦτα ἀλλήλοις) 
(2) second original argument that nothing is (979a31–3) 
a. similar to the second argument against the conjunctive claim ‘both being 
and not-being are’ in Sextus (76) in that both rely on the hypothesis that 
being and not-being are the same: 
i. MXG: ‘nothing would be, unless being and not-being are the same, 
but if they are the same…’ (οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη, εἰ 1ὴ ταὐτόν ἐστιν 
εἶναί τε καὶ 1ὴ εἶναι. εἰ δὲ ταὐτό…) 
ii. Sextus: ‘if being is the same as not-being…’ (εἴ'ερ ταὐτόν ἐστι 
τῶι 1ὴ ὄντι τὸ ὄν…) 
(3) argument against it being ungenerated (ἀγένητον, 979b21–6) 
a. Similar to Sextus’ argument against it being eternal (ἀίδιον, 68–70) in 
making the inference that it is unlimited (ἄ'ειρον in both cases), that it 
is neither in itself (ἐν αὑτῶι in both cases) or in another, and that it is 
nowhere (1ηδα1οῦ MXG, οὐδα1οῦ Sextus). 
(4) argument against it coming to be (γενό1ενον, 979b26–33) 
a. Similar to Sextus’ argument against it being generated (γενητόν, 71) in 
using the same dilemmatic reductio structure, ruling out that it could 
come either from being or from not-being:41 
                                               
41 While both versions have the same structure, the reasons given against it coming from 
being are substantially different. I will set aside the question of which is more accurate 
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i. MXG: ‘For nothing comes to be either from being or from not 
being’ (γενέσθαι γοῦν οὐδὲν ἂν οὔτ’ ἐξ ὄντος οὔτ’ ἐκ 1ὴ 
ὄντος) 
ii. Sextus: ‘For if it has come to be, it has come to be either from 
being or from not-being’ (εἰ γὰρ γέγονεν, ἤτοι ἐξ ὄντος ἢ ἐκ 
1ὴ ὄντος γέγονεν) 
(5) argument against it being either one or many (979b35–980a1) 
a. Similar to Sextus’ argument against it being either one or many (73–4): 
i. MXG: ‘if it is neither one nor many, nothing would be’ (εἰ δὲ 1ήτε 
ἓν 1ήτε 'ολλά, οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη) 
ii. Sextus: ‘it is neither one nor many, as will be established: 
therefore it is not the case that being is’ (οὔτε δὲ ἕν ἐστιν οὔτε 
'ολλά, ὡς 'αρασταθήσεται· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τὸ ὄν) 
While the parallels are clear, they also reveal how the overarching structure differs. The 
order in which arguments are offered, the implied connection between different 
arguments, and the stated conclusion of each one taken on its own all vary significantly. 
These differences are most pronounced in the first two arguments attributed to 
Gorgias. The first argument in the MXG has an affinity with the first argument in Sextus, 
but the second argument is in fact the second to last argument in Sextus’ version. In the 
MXG, both are arguments for the main conclusion that nothing is.42 In Sextus, however, 
                                               
to Gorgias’ original in substance for present purposes; it will not affect the similarities 
and differences in structure that I am interested in here. 
42 οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη (979a30), οὐκ ἂν εἴη οὐδέν (979a31-32), 1ηδὲν εἶναι (979a34). 
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neither is aimed at the main conclusion; each simply rules out one arm of an initial 
trilemma. The first is an argument against the possibility that not-being is and the second 
an argument against the possibility that both being and not-being are.43 On this version, 
Gorgias is not entitled to conclude that nothing is until he has also argued against the 
third possibility, that being is, which in fact occupies most of Sextus’ paraphrase. 
Anonymous takes these first two arguments to be parallel to those he classifies as 
borrowed from others and therefore redundant. Sextus takes them as complementary 
arguments that are essential for drawing Gorgias’ overarching conclusion. 
There is a much closer similarity in the arguments that the MXG classifies as 
borrowed from others, and they appear in the same order as in Sextus. But again there is 
a difference in the stated conclusions. Both versions preserve two alternative arguments 
for the same conclusion, one based on a division between generated and ungenerated, the 
other based on a division between one and many. In the MXG version, the conclusion of 
each is ‘nothing is’.44 But in Sextus the conclusion is ‘it’s not the case that being is’. 
Once again, Anonymous understands these as alternative arguments for the main 
conclusion that nothing is, while Sextus understands them as alternative arguments for 
an intermediate conclusion, one that only licenses the main conclusion when taken in 
conjunction with two other limbs of a trilemma. Anonymous does not report this 
overarching trilemmatic structure, instead seeing three alternative arguments for the 
same conclusion. 
                                               
43 These are the arguments detailed in the previous section.  
44 ἀδύνατον τι καὶ εἶναι (979b34) οὐδέν ἐστιν (980a1). 
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Spatharas offers an explanation for this discrepancy in his commentary (294–8, 
364). He maintains that the MXG version is closer to the original and Sextus rearranged 
the arguments to separate those that had to do with being and not-being from those that 
had to do with a combination of the two. ‘The effort on behalf of Sextus to present a 
smoother and more “logical” arrangement’, he says, ‘may be taken as a sign that MXG 
is closer to the original, Gorgianic arrangement’ (298). On the contrary, I propose that 
the opposite is true: Sextus’ version is closer to the original. This makes On Not-Being 
more consistent with the logical structure of Gorgias’ other works; appealing to 
intervention by Sextus is not necessary to explain the structure of a polylemmatic 
reductio. As we will see, my hypothesis also explains why the MXG differs with evidence 
internal to the text itself: Anonymous’ explicit interest in provenance and a confusion 
concerning wide vs narrow-scope negation. 
Because Anonymous seems particularly interested in where Gorgias’ arguments 
come from, it makes sense that he might have reordered them so as to group together 
first the arguments that are Gorgias’ own and second those he borrowed from others. 
This would only require one small change: fronting Gorgias’ original but puzzling 
argument concerning the conjunctive claim that both being and not-being are. On my 
hypothesis, Anonymous moved it next to Gorgias’ other original but again rather 
puzzling argument against the claim that not-being is. In fact, this hypothesis makes good 
sense of a line that otherwise has puzzled commentators. Just after what the MXG reports 
as Gorgias’ second original argument (which again, on my hypothesis, is transposed from 
the end of the argument) Anonymous says: 
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This then is the same argument as the former one.45 
οὗτος46 1ὲν οὖν ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐκείνου.  (979a33) 
 
This line has caused problems for interpreters. Untersteiner and Buchheim both follow 
Diels in emending ‘same’ (αὐτός) to ‘first’ ('ρῶτος). Foss transposes ὁ and αὐτός, 
which may be what Dillon and Gergel have in mind when they translate: ‘Such, then, is 
his argument.’47 Cassin keeps the manuscript reading, though reads οὕτως with 
manuscript R. On Cassin’s rather optimistic interpretation, Anonymous tells us that he is 
using the very same words, not only the same general sense, as Gorgias does in the 
original (445–7). Yet I take this line to say that the second of the two arguments is the 
same in that it argues for the same conclusion as the first. It makes sense that Anonymous 
might have included this as a justification for moving the second argument here from its 
original location. 
 This is a mistake: Anonymous confuses what are really two separate limbs of a 
trilemma for two arguments for the same conclusion. His mistake in identifying the 
overall aim is enabled by mistakenly treating it as the narrow-scope rather than the wide-
scope conclusion. Anonymous thinks that Gorgias shows that nothing is by establishing 
the narrow-scope claim that each thing (not-being included) is not. When he asks: ‘but if 
                                               
45 Taking ἐκείνου as a genitive of connection or comparison (Smyth 1417, 1431). 
46 Printing οὗτος with L. R has οὕτως. 
47 H.E. Foss, De Gorgia Leontino commentatio, (Halle, 1828); Dillon & Gergel, at 71. 
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it is thus, why does it follow that all things are not rather than are?’48 he betrays his 
narrow-scope understanding of the conclusion. He rightly points out that the narrow-
scope claim ‘each thing is not’ is not warranted by the argument, but wrongly sees it as 
aimed at this narrow-scope claim rather than the wide-scope claim ‘it’s not the case that 
not-being is’ that it actually warrants. Anonymous jumps the gun by assuming that this 
argument alone is meant to license the overarching conclusion, a confusion further 
confirmed by the fact that he helps himself to the claim that being is (which Sextus 
acknowledges needs to be denied independently) in offering his criticism (979b10). This 
confusion about the scope of the negation enables his reordering of the original 
argumentative structure. 
Thus the hypothesis that Sextus remains more faithful to the structure of the first 
part of Gorgias’ On Not-Being makes good sense of both texts as they have come down 
to us, especially as concerns the similarities and differences observed above. Anonymous 
makes one small change in the order of argumentation, moving what he takes to be 
Gorgias’ second original argument to the beginning out of an interest in grouping it with 
Gorgias’ other original contribution. Because he misunderstands the scope of the 
negation he sees this as one of three independent arguments for the same conclusion, 
meaning that the order of presentation does not matter. Sextus, on the other hand, 
accurately sees the overarching trilemmatic structure and preserves the original ordering. 
                                               
48 εἰ δὴ οὕτω, 'ότερον 1ᾶλλον ξυ1βαίνει ἅ'αντα 1ὴ εἶναι ἢ εἶναι; (979b8–9). 
Manuscript R reads as quoted, whereas manuscripts L reads: …ἅ'αντα ἢ εἶναι, 1ὴ 
εἶναι. 
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So why not think, along with Spatharas, that the MXG more accurately preserves 
the structure of the original, that Anonymous’ criticisms are justified, and that Sextus 
cleaned up this structure himself? Of course we cannot know for sure, and it is possible 
that Sextus was the one who rearranged the argument. Yet it is equally possible that it 
was this nuanced structure of the original, at least in part, that drew Sextus to Gorgias’ 
argument in the first place. Furthermore, it seems equally likely that Anonymous could 
have changed the argument to suit his own preferences. Mansfeld points out how 
Anonymous frequently uses Agrippa’s first trope of disagreement, ἀ'ὸ τῆς διαφωνίας, 
throughout the treatise, and how Anonymous’ interpretation of the first part of Gorgias’ 
argument puts much emphasis on this same trope.49 But it could equally be that 
Anonymous was misled by his own argumentative technique and, seeing something 
similar in Gorgias, read it as Gorgias’ main technique. Since these ‘bias towards 
philosophical predilection’ arguments can cut either way, they should carry little weight 
in deciding which structural features are or are not Gorgias’ own. More weight should 
be given to the greater resemblance of Sextus’ argument to Gorgias’ nested polylemmatic 
reductiones in other works and to the evidence internal to the MXG that suggests a 
misunderstanding in the scope of the negation fuelled by an interest in provenance. 
                                               
49 J. Mansfeld, ‘De Melisso, Xenophane, Gorgia: Pyrrhonizing Aristotelianism’, 
Rheinisches Museum für Philologie 131(1988), 239-76 at 249–53. I take this possibility 
that Anonymous rearranged the argument to fit one of his favourite tropes and the 
possibility that Sextus rearranged the argument to fit his logical proclivities to be a wash; 
we should look to other factors to decide which structure is more accurate as I suggest 
below. 
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CONCLUSION 
These structural considerations show that Sextus’ version deserves to be taken more 
seriously than it has been in recent scholarship; it is likely an accurate portrayal of the 
overarching structure of Gorgias’ argument. Once one does so, a number of other 
Gorgianic parallels emerge as well. 
 For example, the argument from the end of (68) to (70) begins with a string of 
hypotheticals: if it is eternal, it has no starting point, if it has no starting point, it is 
unlimited, if it is unlimited it is nowhere. The first argument of the Palamedes contains 
a similar string of hypotheticals beginning in (6): if the crime were possible then a 
discussion would have been possible, if a discussion then communication, if 
communication then a meeting in person, if a meeting in person then a means of speaking 
and being understood in person, etc. Furthermore, there is similar wordplay with the term 
‘starting point’ (ἀρχή) and its cognates. Sextus’ paraphrase says that one must start 
(ἀρκτέον) with the eternal case, and that in that case there is not any starting point 
(ἀρχήν). Similarly, Gorgias has Palamedes ask: ‘when speaking about these matters, 
where should I start (ἄρξω1αι)?’ then begins his defence by stating ‘it would have been 
necessary for some starting point (ἀρχήν) for the treason to come about’. Even further, 
in (70) Sextus states the conclusion of the argument as follows: ‘it’s not even being in 
the first place (τὴν ἀρχὴν)’. It is hard to see the addition of the rather rare adverbial use 
of ἀρχήν here as a mere coincidence.50 The similarity both in the wordplay and in the 
                                               
50 See LSJ s.v. ἀρχή, 1.c). This use of ἀρχή is attested in Antiphon (5.73), one of 
Gorgias’ contemporaries. 
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hypothetical structure is striking; it suggests that Sextus is preserving these elements too 
from Gorgias’ original. 
Towards the end of the first section there is another hint of Sextus preserving 
genuinely Gorgianic phrasing. In the Palamedes Gorgias uses two logically equivalent 
but contrapositive statements to emphasize the incompatibility of two properties: 
statements of the form ‘if p then not-q’ and ‘if q then not-p’. He has Palamedes 
summarize his argument at the beginning as follows: ‘I will show that he doesn’t speak 
the truth in two ways: for if I had been willing I wouldn’t have been able, nor had I been 
able would I have been willing to attempt such deeds’ (5).51 He later goes on to attack 
Odysseus’ testimony directly, ending with the following consideration: ‘So if I am wise 
I didn’t do anything wrong, and if I did something wrong I am not wise. Thus on both 
accounts you would be lying’ (26).52 Sextus’ version of On Not-Being uses this very same 
technique. In (72) he argues: ‘if being is eternal, it has not come to be, and if it has come 
to be, it is not eternal’,53 and again in (76) he claims: ‘if both [being and not-being] are, 
                                               
51 οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγειν διὰ δισσῶν ὑ1ῖν ἐ'ιδείξω τρό'ων· οὔτε γὰρ βουληθεὶς 
ἐδυνά1ην ἂν οὔτε δυνά1ενος ἐβουλήθην ἔργοις ἐ'ιχειρεῖν τοιούτοις. 
52 εἰ 1ὲν οὖν εἰ1ι σοφός, οὐχ ἥ1αρτον· εἰ δ’ ἥ1αρτον, οὐ σοφός εἰ1ι. οὐκοῦν δι’ 
ἀ1φότερα ἂν εἴης ψευδής. 
53 εἰ ἀίδιόν ἐστι τὸ ὄν, οὐ γέγονεν, καὶ εἰ γέγονεν, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀίδιον. Spatharas notes 
the parallel between Palamedes (26) and Sextus (72) in his commentary at 301. 
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they are not the same, and if they are the same, it’s not the case that both are.’54 Once 
again this suggests that Sextus preserves more of the original argument than is often 
presumed. 
 Thus there is much to gain from taking Sextus’ paraphrase of On Not-Being more 
seriously. Despite the fact that he appears to translate much of Gorgias’ terminology into 
the terminology of his own time, there are other respects in which it likely preserves 
elements of the original that are absent from or obscured in the MXG. Yet by no means 
does it follow that the MXG should simply be ignored. There is no simple dichotomy 
here; both paraphrases preserve different aspects of the original argument that are worth 
our attention, and triangulating between them can surely tell us more about what Gorgias’ 
original was really like. It is tempting but inappropriate to dismiss one paraphrase to 
simplify the already daunting task of making sense of Gorgias’ work. Especially when it 
comes to structural features of the first part, Sextus’ version is indispensable for telling 
us more about Gorgias’ overall strategy and for seeing how it fits with a larger pattern of 
Gorgianic argument. 
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54 εἰ γὰρ ἀ1φότερα, οὐ ταὐτόν, καὶ εἰ ταὐτόν, οὐκ ἀ1φότερα. A more conservative 
translation might be more accurate in this case even if a bit clunky: ‘for if “both”, then 
not “same” and if “same”, then not “both”.’ 
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of which would have been impossible to guard),
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1. Enemies stronger than the Greeks would have to have
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2. They would have been brought in either through the
gates, or over the wall with a ladder, or through a hole 
in the wall (each of which would have been impossible),
3. They wouldn't have trusted a traitor in the first place.
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